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“All politics is local,” as the saying goes, but all economics 
is global, and regulation is one area where these two realities 
meet and conflict.1 This has been particularly true for financial 
regulation in the wake of the unprecedented financial crisis. 
The newly prominent Group of Twenty (G-20) heralded 
financial  regulation  as  a  top  priority.  But  almost  two  years 
on, many, especially in Europe, feel that the results have not 
matched the initial ambition. This warrants a reconsideration 
of  the  global  financial  regulatory  agenda.  All  things  being 
equal,  consistent  regulatory  choices  across  the  globe  are 
1. Credit is due to Michael Gadbaw for this use of the late US politician Tip 
O’Neill’s proverbial saying on politics. 
preferable, but achieving consistency involves difficult political 
and economic tradeoffs. 
THE RISE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
“Financial regulation” usually is a cluster of interrelated poli-
cies designed to ensure the proper functioning and integrity of 
the financial system, including public regulation and supervi-
sion of bank capital, leverage, liquidity, and risk management; 
control  of  moral  hazard  and  financial  industry  incentives; 
customer  protection;  and  regulation  of  capital  markets. 
Capital flow controls, prevention of money laundering, and 
taxation of financial activities can overlap with this agenda but 
are not part of it in a strict sense. 
Until the 1970s, financial regulation developed almost 
exclusively as a national endeavor. In 1974, the international 
ripple effects of the bankruptcy of Germany’s Herstatt Bank 
led to the formation by the G-10 central bank governors2 
of  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  (BCBS) 
hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, estab-
lished 1931). In the 1980s, as the savings and loan crisis led 
to tighter capital regulation in the United States, American 
banks successfully argued that equivalent regulation should be 
imposed on banks in other jurisdictions, especially Japan. Thus 
in 1988 the BCBS produced the first Basel Capital Accord. 
Risk weighting under this agreement was subsequently found 
too crude to be effective, and in 2004 the BCBS produced a 
new accord known as Basel II. 
Separately,  a  global  financial  reporting  and  auditing 
framework emerged, at first as a private-sector initiative by the 
international accounting profession through the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 1973 and the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in 1977. The 
IASC was made independent from professional bodies in 2001 
and renamed the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB).  Many  countries  have  agreed  to  adopt  the  IASB’s 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) following 
2. The G-10, established in 1962, is composed of Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, as well as Switzerland, which formally joined in 1983. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 2   S eP t e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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the pioneering decision of the European Union in 2000–02.3 
Securities  regulators  coordinate  at  the  global  level  through 
the  International  Organization  of  Securities  Commissions 
(IOSCO), created in 1983 from a preexisting pan-American 
regional association formed in 1974. Insurance oversight is 
discussed within the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), established in 1994. Public-sector audit 
supervisors, set up in the United States and elsewhere after 
accounting  scandals  including  the  Enron  collapse  in  the 
early 2000s, established in 2006 the International Forum of 
Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR). 
Beyond  these  sector-specific  initiatives,  the  emerging-
market crises of the late 1990s proved that vulnerable financial 
firms could cause international macroeconomic instability. In 
response, finance ministers and central bankers from devel-
oped and developing countries gathered in different group-
ings, successively the G-22 (1998), G-33 (early 1999), and 
eventually the G-20 (late 1999). Simultaneously, developed 
countries established the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to 
enhance their coordination and foster global standards. Also 
in 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was tasked 
with assessing national regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
through the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).4  
The current crisis further enhanced the status of finan-
cial regulation from a technical issue dealt with by specialized 
bodies to a matter of relevance for political leaders. While the 
G-7/G-8, meeting since the 1970s, had tended to focus on 
international macroeconomic and trade issues, G-20 summits 
of  heads  of  state  and  government  since  2008  have  looked 
extensively at financial regulation, which was the focus of no 
fewer than 39 out of the 47 action points in the first G-20 
3. The United States is the main outlier. Japan has not made IFRS mandatory 
but allows companies to use them instead of national standards. 
4. This program is jointly operated with the World Bank when applied to 
developing countries. 
summit declaration (November 2008). In April 2009, G-20 
leaders extended the FSF to major emerging economies and 
renamed it the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The member-
ship of the BCBS and other Basel-based committees was also 
extended to all G-20 countries. See table 1 for an overview 
of how international financial regulatory initiatives have often 
followed major crises.
Because  financial  regulation  only  recently  became  a 
major international economic policy issue, the corresponding 
conceptual and analytical foundation is less solid than for, 
say,  trade  and  international  macroeconomics,  which  have 
been  topics  of  intense  economic  research  and  negotiation 
for decades. The substantial body of literature on financial 
markets and intermediaries has long been tenuously linked 
to  mainstream  economics.  The  impact  of  many  regulatory 
issues  on  specific  market  participants  has  also  made  this 
policy area prone to various forms of private-sector capture. 
Consequently, while it has gained great prominence, financial 
regulation remains a comparatively immature component of 
international economic policy. 
THE NEW CONTEXT: MULTIPOLARITY AND 
REREGULATION
Two major shifts, financial multipolarity and reregulation, will 
shape policy outcomes. The first predates the crisis but was 
arguably reinforced by it, while the second is a direct conse-
quence of it. 
By financial multipolarity we mean that the geography 
of  global  finance  is  rapidly  evolving  from  a  mainly  North 
Atlantic focus toward a much broader canvas. Notwithstanding 
the 1980s bubble in Japan, the joint dominance of the United 
States and Europe in financial matters has long looked resil-
ient, in spite of the rapid catch-up growth of emerging-market 
economies. But the center of gravity of global finance is now 
Table 1     Major crises and international financial regulatory initiatives
Crisis Initiative/institution Period
First World War/German reparations Bank for International Settlements 1931
Great Depression/Second World War/postwar 
reconstruction
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development
1945–48
Herstatt Bank failure Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1974
Latin-American crisis/savings and loan crisis Basel Capital Accord 1988
Transition in former communist countries European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1991
Asian financial crisis Financial Stability Forum, Financial Sector Assessment Program, G-20 1999
Enron/various accounting scandals International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 2006
Global financial crisis G-20 Summits, Financial Stability Board 2008–09N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 2   S eP t e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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moving eastward. Among the world’s 100 largest listed banks 
by market capitalization, the share of emerging markets has 
surged from almost none to over a third, more than either 
the United States or Europe (figure 1). Part of this surge is 
explained by the extraordinary rise in value of major Chinese 
banks since their initial public offerings in 2005–06. Even 
though  their  international  activity  remains  limited  at  the 
moment, these new entrants represent a major change in the 
global landscape. 
A  similar  picture  emerges  when  one  looks  at  global 
financial  centers  rather  than  firms.  Table  2  shows  Asian 
centers to be hot on the heels of London and New York in 
the global pecking order.5 To chase high savings and sovereign 
wealth, asset management teams, which a decade ago would 
have  chosen  London  or  New  York  as  their  obvious  loca-
tion, increasingly base themselves in Dubai, Hong Kong, or 
Singapore.  
Over the next decade, the combination of deleveraging 
in the West and continued financial development in emerging 
economies will certainly reinforce the trend toward multipo-
larity, with a resulting power shift in the global financial policy 
debate, even though emerging countries have been discreet on 
5. Unfortunately, both rankings were introduced too recently to be used to 
analyze mid-term trends. 
these issues so far. An additional factor is that the crisis has 
dented what previously appeared to be Western intellectual 
leadership  in  financial  matters.  Overall,  it  appears  fair  to 
conclude that while the trend toward financial multipolarity 
well predated the crisis, it was significantly accelerated by the 
crisis, the most obvious illustration being the sudden shift of 
power from the G-7/G-8 to the G-20. 
Financial reregulation refers to the heightened concern 
of  policymakers  in  developed  economies  about  financial 
stability and corresponding disillusionment with the economic 
benefits of unfettered finance, leading them to constrain the 
financial  industry  in  new  ways.  For  example,  the  Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
July 2010 in the United States introduces significant changes 
in many areas and is contrary to most suggestions from the 
financial industry.6 The European Union has similarly initi-
ated new financial legislation. In emerging economies, finance 
is typically more tightly regulated and in many cases largely 
or  almost  totally  state-owned.7  Several  such  countries  may 
further liberalize their financial systems to boost credit devel-
6. See, for example, Graham Bowley and Eric Dash, “Wall St. Faces Specter of 
Lost Trading Units,” New York Times, August 6, 2010.
7. Patrick Foulis, “They Might Be Giants,” Special Report on Banking in 
Emerging Markets, Economist, May 15, 2010.
Figure 1     Distribution of global 100 largest listed banks, 1996–2010
Note: Distribution of aggregated market capitalization by country of headquarters. 
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opment and growth, as Raghuram Rajan (2009) recommends 
in the case of India. But this is unlikely to hamper the drive 
toward reregulation in richer economies with a high level of 
financial development. 
Reregulation  should  not  be  seen  as  a  sudden,  across-
the-board paradigm change, but rather as a long-term trend 
reversal.  While  much  financial  business  remained  highly 
regulated, there was a general trend toward liberalization and 
reliance  on  market  discipline  during  the  two  decades  that 
preceded the crisis. The new trend does not mean that all 
financial activities will be regulated in the years ahead, but it 
is nevertheless making its impact felt, is attracting solid cross-
partisan political consensus in most major developed econo-
mies, and will probably not go away any time soon. 
LIMITS AND PRIORITIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COLLECTIVE ACTION
The consequences of financial multipolarity and reregulation 
may be more profound and wide-ranging than has been often 
acknowledged. They make global financial regulatory harmo-
nization a more distant prospect than was the case before the 
crisis. It is easier to harmonize when one country or one bloc 
dominates than when many diverging voices need to concur 
for a decision to be made. It is also easier to harmonize rules 
in an era of deregulation, by reaching agreement on a low 
common denominator, than when expectations are raised as 
to what the rules should achieve and these expectations may 
differ from one jurisdiction to another. 
In today’s multipolar financial world, levels of financial 
development  vary  hugely.  As  a  consequence,  not  only  do 
preferences differ but also governments’ interest in financial 
regulation, and technical capacity to discuss it, are unequal. 
In certain cases, authoritarianism or a fierce commitment to 
sovereignty may limit the scope of global agreement. By the 
same token, multipolarity means that the range of financial 
regulatory issues on which developed countries can negotiate 
an agreement and then impose it on the rest of the world 
is dwindling rapidly. These limitations are likely to become 
increasingly  visible  in  the  next  few  years.  In  the  current 
context, harmonization efforts may lead only to weak global 
standards,  necessarily  complemented  by  tougher  rules  in 
countries with higher regulatory expectations. This is far from 
condemning global discussions to irrelevance but means that 
expectations on their results must remain measured. 
The shift to reregulation also transforms the position of 
several actors, especially the European Union. In the previous 
phase, EU institutions were instinctively internationalist, as 
global initiatives could be effective drivers of intra-EU harmo-
nization. The adoption of IFRS in 2000–02 is a quintessential 
case. It enabled unification of accounting standards throughout 
the European Union, where previous EU-only efforts to achieve 
that aim via directives had failed. But now, such dynamics are 
becoming unlikely as more EU-specific political objectives are 
fed into the regulations. This is illustrated not only by growing 
tensions between the European Union and the IASB (which 
themselves  dampen  the  prospects  of  IFRS  adoption  in  the 
United States) but also by other cases such as the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers directive proposals. Reregulation is 
making the European Union more unilateralist and thus more 
akin to the United States as a power that instinctively thinks 
domestically before thinking internationally. It could even be 
argued that the European Union is at risk of falling behind the 
United States in international awareness, as Washington has 
appeared more mindful of international constraints in recent 
times—for example, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 gives rise to 
fewer problems of extraterritorial application than the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 had. 
The combination of financial multipolarity and reregula-
tion  also  reduces  the  relative  effectiveness  and  increases  the 
complexity  of  soft  coordination,  which  in  turn  gives  more 
salience to formal, often legally grounded processes. The high 
level of voluntary cooperation among central banks throughout 
the crisis provides a counterexample, but the unique specifici-
Table 2     Global financial centers
International Financial Centers 
Development (IFCD) Index
Global Financial  
Centers Index
New York 88.4 London 775
London 87.7 New York 775
Tokyo 85.6 Hong Kong 739
Hong Kong 81.0 Singapore 733
Paris 72.8 Tokyo 692
Singapore 70.1 Chicago 678
Frankfurt 64.4 Zurich 677
Shanghai 63.8 Geneva 671
Washington 61.1 Shenzhen 670
Sydney 59.5 Sydney 670
Sources: Xinhua–Dow Jones IFCD Index, July 2010; Z/Yen and City of London, 7th 
Global Financial Centers Report, March 2010.
Financial integration is a global public good 
whose benefits may be at risk in an era of 
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ties of central banking do not provide a template for regulatory 
policy. Figure 2 scores the 39 financial regulation action items in 
the first G-20 summit declaration. For each item, we have graded 
effectiveness of implementation, cross-border consistency, and 
follow-up initiatives so far. The analysis shows that the more 
the implementation of the action item depends on action by an 
international body with significant autonomy in administration 
and resources, the more effective the implementation. 
Given the reluctance to delegate formal powers to the supra-
national level, which is accentuated by differences of financial-
industry structures across jurisdictions (such as the dominance 
of universal banks in the European Union, state-owned banks 
in developing countries, and differences between common-law 
and civil-law systems), global financial regulation will be unable 
to provide a seamlessly integrated, global level playing field in 
which all financial intermediaries could compete fairly on all 
markets, independent of their country of origin. 
From  this  perspective,  it  should  not  be  a  surprise  if 
the eventual outcome of the “Basel III” discussion, due in 
November 2010, is not deemed demanding enough to meet 
the reregulation requirements of key countries, in spite of the 
achievement of concluding an extremely complex agreement 
in a fairly limited timeframe. Ambitious reregulatory targets 
were promoted by the United States and other countries in 
terms of capital and leverage ratios, as well as the definition of 
tier 1 capital. But due to the opposition of Japan and several 
European  countries,  the  final  compromise  is  likely  to  fall 
short of initial aims on these counts, which could result in 
some countries (possibly including the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland) “goldplating” it with additional 
requirements that would not be internationally harmonized. 
Conversely,  some  European  countries  may  find  the  final 
compromise too lenient on investment banking activities and 
may impose extra capital charges on them. 
Figure 2     Scoring of implementation of financial regulation action items in the November 2008 G-20 declaration,  
  by main decision-making institution
FSB = Financial Stability Board 
BCBS = Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
IASB = International Accounting Standards Board
IOSCO = International Organization of Securities Commissions
IMF = International Monetary Fund
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Separately, measures to tackle the moral hazard inherent 
in systemically important financial institutions, on which the 
FSB is to produce a report later this year, and more generally 
rules that shape the structure of the financial industry, such 
as the Volcker Rule in the United States, will predominantly 
belong to the national (or EU) level as the differences of struc-
tures of different banking systems multiply the political chal-
lenges to global convergence. Meanwhile, insistence on fiscal 
sovereignty makes it unlikely that strong supranational bank 
resolution regimes could emerge. Only the European Union 
may constitute an exception if it eventually adopts a crisis 
management framework such as that proposed by the IMF in 
March 2010 (Fonteyne et al. 2010, Strauss-Kahn 2010), and 
even this remains far from assured at this point. 
Fortunately,  many  aspects  of  financial  stability  policy 
can be effectively tackled at the local level, and diversity of 
approaches  can  even  be  beneficial.  As  figure  3  illustrates, 
international  activity  of  large  banks  is  typically  less  than 
one-quarter of the total. The main exception is the European 
Union, where a high level of cross-border integration and the 
commitment to a single market call for a strong supranational 
supervisory framework, which is currently being discussed. 
But  elsewhere,  even  multinational  groups  do  not  require 
internationally uniform supervision. The likes of HSBC or 
Banco  Santander  illustrate  that  international  synergies  can 
arise from the leverage of technological prowess or consumer 
service know-how, even with locally capitalized and funded 
subsidiaries that are subject to disparate supervisory standards. 
As for cross-border retail branches, they are a generally disap-
pearing species following the Iceland’s experience. 
However,  some  crucial  regulatory  concerns  can  be 
addressed only at the global level. Without adequate global 
collective action, there is a risk of fragmentation of global 
capital  markets.  The  economic  benefits  of  global  financial 
integration have been questioned in the case of developing 
economies (Rodrik and Subramanian 2009), and the Asian 
crisis in particular led international financial institutions to 
step  back  from  advocating  unlimited  openness  to  foreign 
capital flows (IMF 2007). But for developed economies, and 
increasingly  for  emerging  economies  as  well,  there  is  wide 
agreement among economists that capital-market integration 
has a significant positive impact on growth, by broadening the 
pool of investors that capital-hungry economic actors can tap 
into, and conversely by broadening the range of investment 
opportunities for capital providers (see a development of this 
argument and extensive literature review in Cline 2010). 
In  other  terms,  and  with  due  qualification,  financial 
integration  is  a  global  public  good  whose  benefits  may  be 
at risk in an era of financial multipolarity and reregulation. 
Reregulation enhances the risk of mutually incompatible poli-
cies leading to market fragmentation, and no single power 
can  exert  sufficient  leadership,  benevolent  or  otherwise,  to 
Figure 3     Degree of internationalization of the largest listed banks in selected jurisdictions 
Note: Average distribution of total 2009 revenue. 
Sources: Corporate reports; authors’ calculations. Mauricio Nakahodo’s research assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
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ensure consistency. The crisis itself has stalled the growth of 
cross-border financial flows to emerging countries, as figure 4 
illustrates. Available data such as those collected by McKinsey 
Global Institute (2010) suggest that the same is true of global 
capital flows more generally. 
A PRACTICAL AGENDA FOR GLOBAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS
To  ensure  the  sustainability  of  financial  integration,  four 
components are essential.  The first is stronger global public 
institutions. The current environment makes this difficult to 
achieve but at the same time more necessary, as the poten-
tial  for  effective  voluntary  coordination  is  eroded.  Global 
public institutions help to provide a comprehensive analytical 
picture, set authoritative standards, and foster and monitor 
consistency of regulatory practice. Policymakers should build 
on  existing  bodies  wherever  possible,  but  where  suitable 
bodies are unavailable, they must also be ready to create new 
ones. The G-20 can play a major role in empowering such 
institutions and granting them wide acceptance, but it cannot 



























































































































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database and forecasts, April 2010.
billions of US dollars
claim to represent all countries and is bound to fail if it tries 
to micromanage individual topics. The overall geography of 
global public bodies, whose symbolic but also practical impact 
cannot be overstated, should be rebalanced, perhaps by relo-
cating one of the Bretton Woods institutions in Asia. 
Key pillars of a global financial body’s strength include 
(1) a transparent governance framework that clearly sets out 
its mission, properly identifies its stakeholders, and makes it 
accountable to them; (2) adequate and stable financial and 
human resources, avoiding funding mechanisms that could be 
leveraged by special interests to compromise the body’s inde-
pendence;  (3)  sufficient  access  to  relevant  information,  for 
which formal commitments by national or regional authorities 
may often be indispensible; and (4) practice that is consistent 
with its proclaimed aims. 
As far as existing institutions are concerned, the current 
discussion on IMF governance reform should be concluded 
with  a  better  representation  of  emerging  economies,  thus 
mirroring  present  and  future  financial  multipolarity.  The 
IASB should reform its governance model to make itself more 
directly accountable to its stakeholders, especially investors N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 2   S eP t e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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who are the primary users of financial reporting and whose 
trust in IFRS standard-setting has tended to decrease in recent 
years. It should also reform its funding structure accordingly, 
streamline its oversight structures, and add public authori-
ties from leading emerging economies to those that already 
control  it  through  the  Monitoring  Board  formed  in  early 
2009. The BCBS should make its proceedings more open to 
outside scrutiny, beyond the central banking and supervisory 
community. The BIS and IMF should be formally guaranteed 
better access to nonpublic national data. And the status of 
the FSB, including its relationship (or lack thereof) with the 
BIS, should be clarified if this unique institution is to find a 
sustainable role in the global landscape. The FSB should also 
diversify the chairmanship of its work streams. 
Second,  globally  consistent  financial  information  is 
crucial. In addition to the governance changes suggested above, 
the IASB should better monitor how IFRS are applied, in 
liaison with local authorities. It should also insist on universal 
recognition of voluntary IFRS adoption by those issuers that 
desire it, instead of trying to have each of its standards made 
mandatory everywhere, which is an overly ambitious aim in 
the short term. Such measures are needed to prevent the risk 
of  this  unique  experiment  in  global  standard-setting  being 
derailed.8 
Equally  important  is  to  ensure  better  consistency  of 
audits. Currently, audit firms are regulated only at the national 
level; IFIAR does not even have a permanent secretariat. The 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 attempted to grant US audit 
oversight authorities an extraterritorial mandate, but this has 
not  been  accepted  internationally.  A  new  global  body  (or 
dramatic stepping up of IFIAR’s status) may be needed in the 
future to underpin the global integrity of audit processes. 
Public information on financial risks should be dramati-
cally enhanced, especially for financial-sector firms. Current 
8. These points will be further developed in a policy paper on accounting 
policy, whose publication by Bruegel is forthcoming.  
risk disclosure frameworks, whether as part of IFRS or Basel 
II (“third pillar”), have proved insufficient, and the malfunc-
tion of credit rating agencies in assessing structured products 
has compounded the problem. The publication of “stress test” 
results in the United States (May 2009) and the European 
Union (July 2010) was linked to the crisis and may not be 
made a regular process, but regulators must find a way to bring 
lasting improvement to financial risk disclosure. Additionally, 
public supervision of rating agencies, which is spreading at a 
rapid pace,9 should be very strongly coordinated at the global 
level in order to safeguard the global consistency of rating 
methodologies. 
At an aggregate level, the degree of internationally compa-
rable information currently available to the public on financial 
systems  and  markets,  including  disclosures  on  government 
finances and their support to financial firms, is entirely insuf-
ficient. It must be increased. Governments and supervisors 
should make a credible commitment to provide much more 
detailed, reliable, and frequent information, to be pooled at 
the global level by the IMF and/or the BIS and to be made 
publicly available in an appropriate form. 
Third,  new  arrangements  are  needed  to  enable  and 
adequately  supervise  globally  integrated  capital-market 
infrastructure. The “plumbing” that underpins markets for 
securities and derivatives is a big determinant of cross-border 
integration. Most prominently, the new trend to have over-the-
counter derivatives cleared by central counterparties, or even 
migrated to organized trading platforms, is to be welcomed, 
but it increases the risk of fragmentation along geographical or 
currency lines of markets that until now had achieved global 
scale. Central counterparties are systemically important and 
quintessentially “too big to fail” financial institutions, which 
raises the question of how some form of fiscal backstop could 
be put in place if their supervision were to be transferred to 
the supranational level.  
However, ex-ante burden sharing, or a formal agreement 
by all or most jurisdictions concerned about how to apportion 
the cost of an international bailout, is easier to envisage in this 
area than in the case of banks, given the relatively straightfor-
ward nature of the activity. Therefore, global or supranational 
supervision may come earlier to clearing (and perhaps trading) 
platforms than to cross-border banks. It is also an arguably 
more pressing need, given these players’ central role in shaping 
global market integration. 
9. Before the crisis, only the United States and a few other jurisdictions such 
as Argentina, Mexico, and South Korea formally regulated and supervised 
credit rating agencies. Now Australia, the European Union, India, and Japan 
have introduced regulation in this area, and several others are in the process of 
doing so. 
…the future global financial regulatory 
landscape is more likely to resemble 
a Japanese garden, with new details 
and new perspectives emerging at 
each step, than a centralized and 
symmetrical jardin à la française.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 2   S eP t e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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Fourth, capital-market intermediaries require a global 
playing field. We argued in the previous section that retail 
banking regulation can largely be tackled by individual juris-
dictions. However, the activity of investment banks and many 
nonbank capital market intermediaries tends to be more glob-
ally integrated, which is bound to create tensions in a world in 
which supervision is reinforced but remains far from interna-
tionally consistent. Recovery and resolution plans, or “living 
wills,” are a promising novel idea to ensure orderly manage-
ment of failing globally integrated financial institutions, but 
they may increase fragmentation in the absence of an inter-
national resolution authority. Moreover, investment banking 
arms of universal banks from large countries benefit from the 
government guarantee on their home-country deposits and 
access  to  central-bank  funding  to  an  extent  unavailable  to 
competitors from small countries, which may be “too big to 
save” given limited fiscal capacity at home, and to pure-play 
investment banks, which do not have access to such guar-
anteed funding. There is no obvious solution at hand, and 
we may have to live for some time with serious competitive 
distortions, with players from smaller countries being placed 
at a structural disadvantage. More public discussion is needed 
on these challenges, which have been insufficiently debated 
until now. A stronger international competition policy frame-
work may be part of the answer in order to fight damaging 
economic nationalism of governments as well as predatory 
behavior by intermediaries. 
All in all, the future global financial regulatory landscape 
is more likely to resemble a Japanese garden, with new details 
and new perspectives emerging at each step, than a centralized 
and symmetrical jardin à la française. Consistency will not be 
uniformly achieved, the boundary between global and local 
decision-making will remain controversial and in flux, and a 
spirit of experimentation and institutional entrepreneurship 
will be required. As political philosopher Francis Fukuyama 
put it in a lecture in 2005 at Yale University, “Creating new 
institutions that will better balance the requirements of legiti-
macy and effectiveness will be the prime task for the coming 
generation”  (Fukuyama  2006).  This  statement  certainly 
applies to financial regulation. 
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